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Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Another v Redell and Others and Two Related Cases 2021
SA 268 (WCC)
Dunia P. Zongwe 1
This case teaches activists how to respond when they get SLAPPed. It introduced a defense mechanism
to prevent lawsuits launched by big corporations to silence criticisms. North American lawyers
commonly refer to these lawsuits as ‘strategic litigation (or lawsuits) against public participation
(SLAPP). Two scholars from the United States of America (US) coined this acronym. 2 And, in 2021,
for the first time in South Africa, a court recognized the SLAPP phenomenon and accepted a defense
against this kind of lawsuits.
Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Another v Redell and Others and Two Related Cases
(hereinafter ‘Redell’) brings up several key questions relating to the abuse of the court process. South
African law forbids people from abusing the court process by commencing legal action for the wrong
reasons or for ulterior motives. However, as the judge in Redell claimed, these mechanisms do not
suffice to tackle the SLAPP phenomenon. 3
At the same time, the anti-SLAPP plea that the Western Cape Division of the High Court
accepted in Redell appears just as limited as the law on abuse of process. The core problem is
that recognizing anti-SLAPP pleas like the court did in Redell distracts judges and calls on
them to second-guess the motives of litigants – something that consumes time as evidence as
to motives can be very had to secure. Thus, courts will likely end up wasting resources secondguessing the litigants’ motives and risk denying plaintiffs access to justice when they could
simply determine cases on their merits. More concerning, the judge in Redell could not show
why the existing rules on abuse of process could not defeat SLAPP suits and, in that sense, it
failed to establish why it had become necessary to introduce anti-SLAPP defenses into the legal
system. The rest of this Commentary also reveals the other respects in which the judgment in
Redell came up short.
Facts
The Redell case arose from a series of three defamation lawsuits that two mining companies
lodged against three community activists and three environmental attorneys. Specifically, two
mining companies involved in exploring and developing major mineral-sands projects in South
Africa, known as the Tormin Mineral Sands Project and the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project,
took legal action against the three activists (i.e., Clarke, Cloete, and Dlamini) and the three
attorneys (i.e., Redell, Davies, and Cullinan) for defamation. The two companies (i.e., Mineral
Commodities Ltd and Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd) claimed (1) damages worth a total
of 14,25 million South African Rand [i.e., roughly 950 000 US dollars] or, alternatively, (2)
the publication of apologies. 4
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Thus, the plaintiffs sued for about R14 million the three activists and the three lawyers
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’) in three separate cases because the defendants
denounced the effects that the mining activities of the two mining companies (hereinafter ‘the
plaintiffs’) had on the environment, ecology, and economy of the Wild Coast. In the three
actions against them, the defendants raised a SLAPP defense. 5
In the dispute between Mineral Commodities Ltd (MCL) and Clarke (one of the three activists),
MCL alleged that, between 2014 and 2015, Clarke published two defamatory e-books and that,
in 2016, he criticized by several means (for example, YouTube videos, emails, televised panel
discussions, and interviews on radio and social-media platforms) the plaintiffs’ mining and
excavating activities. MCL detailed Clarke’s alleged defamatory conduct and filed 27 separate
claims against him and requested damages in the sum of R10 million [i.e., about 667 000 US
dollars]. 6
In the matter opposing MCL against Dlamini and Cullinan (i.e., an activist and an
environmental attorney, respectively), MCL participated on 7 April 2016 in a radio interview
posted online on the station’s website. MCL and its Chief Executive Officer (i.e., Mark Victor
Caruso) claimed a total sum of R3 million [about 200 000 US dollars] in damages. 7 And, in the
dispute that pitted Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd (MSR) against two attorneys (i.e., Redell
and Davies) and one activist (i.e., Cloete), MSR and its director (i.e., Zamile Qunya) sought a
total of R 1 250 000 [i.e., roughly 83 000 US dollars] against the trio for delivering on
25 January 2017 at the University of Cape Town a lecture series that targeted the Tormin mine. 8
In those lectures, entitled ‘Mining the Wild and West Coast: “Development” at What Cost?’,
the three defendants allegedly defamed MSR.
The Western Cape Division of the High Court consolidated those three actions into a single
case.
The parties’ arguments
The defendants, the plaintiffs, and two amicii curiae (i.e., the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 9
and the University of Cape Town) made submissions. In response to the three lawsuits, the
defendants deployed SLAPP defenses, to which the plaintiffs raised objections. Accordingly,
the Cape Town-based High Court proceeded to entertain the SLAPP defense first, before
determining the plaintiffs’ objections.
The defendants entered two special pleas, one of which prayed the court to stop the plaintiffs
from abusing the court process by pursuing meritless cases and claiming exorbitant amounts
of money, with the hidden intention to sue and intimidate the MCL into silence. This special
plea read as follows: 10
[6] The defendants plead that the plaintiffs’ conduct in bringing each of the actions —
[6.1] is an abuse of process; and/or
[6.2] amounts to the use of court process to achieve an improper end and to use
litigation to cause the defendants financial and/or other prejudice in order to
silence them; and/or
Redell (n) [5].
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[6.3] violates the right to freedom of expression entrenched in s 16 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 3 (the Constitution).
In concrete terms, the plaintiffs tried, through this special plea, to introduce in South African
law a defense to counter SLAPP suits.
The plaintiffs objected that the defendants’ special plea entirely relied on the plaintiffs’ motives
in filing the defamation lawsuits. The plaintiffs submitted that relying solely on motives,
without assessing the merits of their complaints is unsound in law. 11 As a consequence, the
defendants’ plea lacked averments necessary to sustain the defense. 12
The plaintiffs insisted that the defendants cannot ignore the merits of their lawsuits and focus
exclusively on their motives in bringing the suits, and that (ulterior) motives are irrelevant to
the abuse-of-process debate. 13 The plaintiffs added that, by precluding the court from
examining the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim, the defendants’ plea would amount to a request
that the court take an unprecedented and extraordinary step of shutting down its doors on the
plaintiffs, thereby violating their rights to access justice in terms of section 34 of the South
African Constitution. 14
Moreover, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendants failed to invoke section 2(1)(b)6 of the
Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 (VPA). 15 For the plaintiffs, South African law confines
the defendants’ protection against abuse of process to the VPA. And, because they omitted to
invoke section 2(1)(b)6 and apply, as required by that provision, for protection against a
vexatious litigant, the defendants could only fall back on common-law rules governing abuse
of process. 16
Citing case law, the plaintiffs reminded the court of how the law defines ‘abuse of process’:
Legal proceedings constitute an abuse of process where a party institutes them without any
reasonable grounds and where he obviously cannot sustain those proceedings on their merits,
as a certainty and not merely on a preponderance of probability. 17
The mining companies argued, in the alternative, that no bases exist for the court to develop
the common law, as requested by the defendants. The plaintiffs submitted that the defendants
must establish that the common-law principles that apply to abuse of process are formulated in
terms that do not conform to a particular constitutional right or to the constitutional value
system, thereby triggering the duty to develop the common law. 18 They concluded that the law
does not allow the court to develop the common law to rewrite the test for an abuse of process
by shifting attention from merits to motives or to treat ulterior motives as amount to abuse of
process. 19
The defendants conceded that they omitted to pursue an application in terms of the VPA. 20
They, however, highlighted the fact that both parties accepted that, in exception proceedings,
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the court must recognize as correct each allegation pleaded in the defendants’ special plea. 21
Hence, the court must accept as true that the mining companies do not honestly believe that
they have any prospect of recovering the quantum of damages claimed from the defendants, as
well as the motives of those companies in suing the defendants. 22
The defendants cited cases to support their proposition that motive or purpose does actually
matter in abuse-of-process debates 23 and they argued that the law cannot permit the purpose of
intimidating and silencing public criticism. 24 They also contended that the mining companies
failed to produce any authority for their contention that the motive behind a legally valid
procedure is generally irrelevant under the existing South African common law. 25 The
defendants reframed the core issue as one that does not concern the abuse of procedures, but
rather as one that involves the question as to when an abuse of process may serve as a defense
against a substantive claim. 26
The defendants maintained that debates that take place within the context of mining rights,
environmental damage and the economic power of large trading firms call for heightened
public scrutiny an engagement. 27 They also insisted that South Africa’s constitutional scheme
does not countenance the plaintiffs’ contention that they can sue activists for defamation even
if, in doing so, the plaintiffs only seek to silence them. 28 That constitutional scheme advocates
for freedom of expression, active public engagement in environmental assessment issues, and
active public scrutiny of large multinationals. 29 Like UCT, the defendants asserted that they
enjoyed a constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The mining companies, the defendants, and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS)
examined the nature, origins, and developments of SLAPP in different jurisdictions. Relying
on the US example, the mining companies argued that, because anti-SLAPP regulation displays
great complexity and indicates the complexities involved in drafting legislation, the courts
should leave it to the Parliament to decide whether to introduce similar anti-SLAPP regulation
in South African law. 30
The defendants countered that the courts should not allow mining companies to bring SLAPP
suits in circumstances where these companies know that those suits do not offer any realistic
prospect of recovering the damages they seek and where they intend to intimidate and silence
civil society, the public, and the media. 31 Alternatively, the defendants argued that the court
could develop the common law, through the lens of either section 39(2) or section 173 of the
Constitution,32 to deal with SLAPP suits in the same manner that the courts developed it to lay
down procedures for class actions. 33
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Rulings of the High Court
From the outset, Goliath DJP remarked that section 173 of the Constitution, the common law,
and case law give the courts the inherent power to stop frivolous and vexatious proceedings
when they amount to an abuse of its processes. 34 She emphasized that abusing the judicial
process interferes with due administration of justice, offends fundamental notions of justice,
and undermines the integrity of the judicial process. 35 The judge then quoted section 24 (i.e.,
the right to a clean and safe environment) and section 16 of the Constitution (i.e., freedom of
expression, including academic freedom).
Crucially, Goliath DJP delved into the origins, nature and traits of SLAPP phenomenon; and
she compared the laws in several jurisdictions (for example, Canada and the European Union),
leaning heavily on the situation in the US. 36 The court recognized the competing policies that
a judge must considering when trying to distinguish a SLAPP suit from an ordinary civil
lawsuit. 37
In the end, the court concluded that the mining companies’ proceedings “matches the DNA of
a SLAPP suit”. 38 It concluded that the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs were vexatious,
constituted an improper use of the judicial process, and did not align with South Africa’s
constitutional values and scheme. 39 Most importantly, she ruled that the SLAPP-suit defense
mounted by the defendants constituted a valid defense to the plaintiffs’ action. 40
Goliath DJP arrived at her conclusion that the proceedings amounted to a SLAPP suit after she
made several findings. She first found that the plaintiffs were powerful corporates engaged in
mining activities and claiming “inexplicably exorbitant amounts for damages” that the
defendants can ill-afford 41 whereas the defendants were environmental activists and attorneys
with much less resources than the mining companies. 42 Goliath DJP found that the mining
companies commenced court proceedings fully aware that that the proceedings had no realistic
prospect of recovering the damages they requested. 43 She observed that targeting a group of
environmentalist activists more or less at the same time may have the effect of intimidating
them to such a degree that they may withdraw from further activism after the action for
damages. 44 For the judge, “[i]t is evident that the strategy adopted by the plaintiffs is that the
more vocal and critical the activist is, as is the case with Clark, the higher the damages amount
claimed”. 45
Crucially, Goliath DJP found that “it appears that the action is not aimed at obtaining monetary,
or financial, damages, but rather at vindicating a right, or for some other purpose.” 46 She then
highlighted the fact that the mining companies had indicated that, in the alternative, they would
agree to dispose of the matter if the defendants publicly apologize. According, demanding
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public apologies is “a signature mark of many SLAPP suits”.47 For that reason, Goliath DJP
declared that “[t]he conclusion is incontrovertible that the lawsuit was initiated against the
defendants because they have spoken out and had assumed a specific position in respect of the
plaintiffs’ mining companies”. 48
In ruling in the defendants’ favor, the judge accepted the defendants’ arguments about the
significance of public participation and the chilling effect of SLAPP suits on environmental
rights and land-use decisions, as well as the necessity to open the socio-economic power of
large companies to public scrutiny without the risk of crippling liability for defamation. 49
The Western Cape Division of the High Court agreed with the defendants. She therefore
dismissed with costs the exception that MCL raised against the anti-SLAPP special plea
deployed in response to MCL’s initial lawsuit.50
Significance: The signature traits of a SLAPP suit
The true significance of Redell depends on the question whether a gap really existed, in the
sense that South African law could not handle SLAPP suits. Here, lawyers and jurists will
disagree. Critics would affirm that the common law rules on abuse of process could defeat
those suits adequately. For them, developing the common law to import an anti-SLAPP defense
was redundant.
For her part, however, Goliath DJP identified a lacuna, a gap in South African law. She
observed that South African law does not legislative mechanisms that specifically deal with
SLAPP.51 In doing so, she seems to have agreed with CALS, which contended that SLAPP
defenses differed from an abuse of process. 52
Goliath DJP feared that corporates may exploit this lack of legal framework and, in doing so,
make it more likely for civil society to get SLAPPed by those corporates. 53 She concluded by
saying that this gap should not compromise the interests of justice. 54
Noting that they originated in the US in the 1980s and emerged recently in most jurisdictions,
she defined SLAPP suits as “meritless or exaggerated lawsuits intended to intimidate civilsociety advocates, human-rights defenders, journalists, academics and individuals, as well as
organizations acting in the public interest.” 55 With these suits, activists are “litigated into
silence” and “oftentimes drained of their [i.e., the activists’] resources”. 56 For the judge, the
essence of these suits is “to silence those challenging powerful corporates on issues of public
concern”. 57
The judge quoted Pring and Canan, the academics who first coined the acronym ‘SLAPP’ and
who described the classic SLAPP suit as “a civil claim targeting a ‘non-government party’ on
an issue of considerable social importance, involving local citizens who take a position on a
particular issue and express their views in the public arena.” 58 She also noted that research by
Redell (n) [62].
Redell (n) [62].
49
Redell (n) [63].
50
Redell (n) [67].
51
Redell (n) [65].
52
Redell (n) [25].
53
Redell (n) [65].
54
Redell (n) [65].
55
Redell (n) [39].
56
Redell (n) [39] and [65].
57
Redell (n) [39].
58
Redell (n) [39].
47
48

17

the two academics revealed that SLAPP suits most frequently take the form of an action for
defamation, especially in relation to environmental campaigning and protest action. 59
The judge went on to distinguish the ‘signature elements’ of SLAPP cases. They consist in (1)
the use of the legal system, usually disguised as an ordinary civil claim, (2) but designed to
discourage others from speaking out on issues of public importance, (3) by claiming exorbitant
damages, 60 and (4) exploiting the inequality of finances and human resources that large
corporations boast, as compared to the defendants. 61 Fundamentally, these suits – “notoriously
long, drawn-out, and extremely expensive legal battles” that consume vast amounts of time,
energy, money and resources – aim to “turn the justice system into a weapon to intimidate
people who are exercising their constitutional rights, to restrain public interest in advocacy and
activism, and to convert matters of public interest into technical private-law disputes.” 62 They
do not aim to vindicate legitimate rights. 63 The plaintiffs typically demand an apology, as an
alternative to an exorbitant monetary claim. 64
As a consequence of the emotional and financial harm caused by these suits, the defendants
may withdraw from actions involving public participation. 65 A SLAPP does not have to
succeed in court to achieve its intended effect: 66
Prolonging and dragging out proceedings and shifting the debate out of the public
domain to the courts can fulfil the intended objective. The mere threat of being sued is
sometimes sufficient to engender fear and intimidate the target.
However, although UCT put forth a compelling case for the greater protection of the freedom
of academics to speak and debate issues confronting society, 67 Goliath DJP did not address
academic freedom of expression as a separate right or a right deserving greater protection.
Instead, she took up the freedom-of-expression question generally without singling out
academic freedom of expression. For instance, she recognized that “the right to freedom of
expression, robust public debate and the ability to participate in public debates without fear is
essential in any democratic society.” 68
The most disturbing aspect of Redell comes down to the failure by the judge to acknowledge
the almost imperceptible line separating a SLAPP suit from an ordinary defamation claim.
Goliath DJP said that requesting that defendants publicly apologize characterize SLAPP suits,
but ordinary defamation claim also feature such requests. Likewise, the judge noted that
SLAPPers typically demand that defendants pay exorbitant amounts, but so do people who
initiate defamation claims in good faith. In such cases, judges simply reduce the exorbitant
amount prayed for by the plaintiffs. Another way of saying that the judge in Redell could not
show that the complaining mining firms, however powerful and resourceful, were not
legitimate plaintiffs. In short, Goliath DJP should not have jumped to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs’ suits in Redell SPLAPPed the defendants without examining the merits of the suits
beforehand.
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Conclusion
On the one hand, it is quite refreshing and reassuring to see courts displaying the progressive
disposition that the court in Redell did. This case, in particular, stressed that individuals and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must have the freedom to respond to issues afflicting
society, like the issues that pertain to the environment and sustainable development, especially
when corporates mainly caused damage to the environment and biodiversity. 69 Goliath DJP
stressed that public debate and dialogue, with broad participation in issues of public interest
such as the environment, must be encouraged; and any action aimed at stifling and impairing
such debates must be discouraged. 70
But sometimes this progressive mindset may lead to the creation of unnecessary rules. And,
this is what seems to have happened in Redell. The existing rules precluding abuse of process
in South Africa appear strong enough to prevent SLAPP suits. In other words, the court in
Redell failed to demonstrate that it had become necessary to introduce anti-SLAPP pleas into
South African law. This does not mean that South African law does not need those pleas; it
only points out that the judge in Redell failed to establish this necessity.
It remains to be seen how other courts, especially the Supreme Court of Appeal, will react to
the introduction of anti-SLAPP pleas into South African law. While this move sounds forwardthinking, it nonetheless poses a number of difficulties. Essentially, if the court determines that
a lawsuit lacks merit, then why should the court not dismiss the case on the basis that it
precisely lacks merit. Going as far as investigating into why a litigant started legal action
requires more resources. In that sense, accepting the anti-SLAPP plea will, in many instances,
prove wasteful.
Another concern relates to the fact that entertaining anti-SLAPP pleas will distract judges
because, instead of focusing on the merits of the SLAPPers, judges will end up divining the
true motives of the parties – a futile and time-consuming exercise as litigants often struggle to
obtain evidence as to motives.
When big corporations SLAPP activists and journalists, and their lawyers, judges should not
slap back those corporations by accepting anti-SLAPP pleas. They could resolve defamation
claims more effectively by both assessing the reasonableness of those claims and by applying
the existing rules on abuse of process.
Nonetheless, the case brings in sharp relief the incredible power of multinational companies.
They have a financial advantage and human resource advantage over less resourced activists,
civil-society activists, and non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, like MCL
protested, accepting anti-SLAPP pleas may shut down the doors of the court to corporations
even before the corporations had gotten a chance to speak to the judge. Still, the Redell case
teaches a salutary lesson to the public: If they get SLAPPed, people should not give those big
corporations the other cheek; they can call on the courts to clap back.
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